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[L. A... No. 21266. In Bank. Mar. 24, 1950.]

WILLIAM BAFFA, Appellant, v. JOHNNIE A. JOHNSON
et al., Respondents.
[1] Bales-Recovery of Money Paid: Vendor a.nd Purchaser-Relief from Forfeiture of Purchasers Interest.-A defaulting
vendee under a contract to purchase real and pers(nal property may recover part payments after further performance
under the contract has terminated, if he proves facts justifying
relief from forfeiture under Civ. Code, I 3275.
[S] Id.-Recovery of Money Paid: Vendor and Purchaser-Relief
from Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest.-Under Civ. Code,
II 3275, 3369, a defaulting vendee seeking restitution of part
of his payments will be denied relief if his breach is wilful;
but if he is able to prove that the vendor has received more
than the benefit of his bargain, the 60urt is precluded by Civ.
Code, § 3369, from quieting the vendor's title unless ho refunds
the excess.
[1J See 22 Oal.Jur. 1009, 1032; 2Ci Oal.Jm. 623; 19 A.m.Jm. 99.
Melt. Dig. References: [1-3] Sales, I 257; Vendor a.nd Purchuer,
1136.
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Id.-Recovel7 of Money Paid: Vendor and Purchaser-Relief
from Forieiture of Purchaser's Interest.-A defaulting vendee
was not entitled to recover a down payment of $5,000 made
1IJlder a written contract to purchase:: a cocktail lounge and
business for $93,000, where he introduced no evidence to
prove that, when he repudiated the contrsct, the property was
, worth more than $88,000 to the vendors.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa
County. Otto J. Emme, Judge. Affirmed.

.A.",,..,,u. for money had and received. Judgment for deaffirmed.

LallrelD.Ce J. Rittenband, Sidney H. Rivkin, Frederiek Brunaud Raymond A. Nelson for Appellant.
8ttlmen8~ekln'

& Isenberg and Carl B. Sturzenacker for

TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintifi brought this action to recover a
payment of $5,000 made under a written contract in
,-,),."',), he agreed to buy defendants' cocktail lounge and busifor $93,000. The contract provided for the payment of
II;W''''','IVV in cash with the balance payable at $1,000 per month
secured by a deed of trust. In addition to the down pay, $15,000 was to be deposited on the opening of escrow
ftjlthin 45 days. The contract provided that if the vendee
to deposit the additional cash payments in escrow, the
IMInClO1'8 would retain the $5,000 as liquidated damages. The
found on substantial evidence that defendants peraU that was required of them under the contract and
f'l)laiintijf refused to open an escrow and abandoned the
Judgment was entered for defendants and plaintiff

)

."Plillin't.ift' contends that the damages to ,which defendants
~n1ltH~ for his failure to perform the contract should be,

amount paid down in part performance, but an
determined under Civil Code, section 3307.- [1] It
."
been stated that the vendor may retain payas an alternative remedy to an action for damages for
cJetrim.ent caused by the breach of an agreement to purcluu!e an
real property. is deemed to be the excess. if any, of the amouut
. .·.1IrOnld have been due to the seller. under tae contract, ever the
tae property to him."
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breach of a contra(!t to purchase I'ea! property (Glock v.
Howard &- Wil.~o1t CololIY 00.,123 Cal. I, 10 [55 P. 713. 69
Am.St.Rl'p. 17. 4:3 L.R.A. 1!l!)l; !\('l' cases cited in Barkis
Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116. 120-121 [208 P.2d 367J.) It is now
settled, however. that the defaulting- venut'e may recover part
payments after further perfol'!llancE' undf'r the contract bas
terminated, if he prov('!\ facts· justifying relief under Civil
Code, section 3275. t (Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116 [208 P.2d
367 J.) As pomted out in the Barkis case, .. The facts in the
Glock case and similar eases suggest that the reason no attempt
was made to r('iy upon section 3275 was that .the defaulting
vendee could not qualify for relief under that section and
that therefore his only hope of recovering any of the money·
he had paid or ke('ping the contract alive was in proving that
it was the vendor who was in default. In many cases the
amount forfeited was a smaH fraction of the total price and
thcre was no indication that it exceeded in amounf the damage
caused the vendor by the vendee's brE'ach. [Citations.] On
the other hand, when relief bas been sought and denied under
sec:tion 3275 the courts have frequently pointed out that the
damages sustained by the vendor were no less in amount
than the vendee had already paid l Citations], or that the nature of the ·condition that was breached was such that it was
impossible to compute the actual damages involved. [Citations.] In other cases the vendee has been unable to continue
with performance of the contract, and although such inability
prevents his default from being wilful [Citations], it also
defeats his right to have the contract kept in force, since he is
unable to make full compensation for the default. [Citations.]" (34 Cal.2d at 121-122.)
[2] Notwithstanding the evidence in this case that plain·
tiff's breach was wilful, he contends that since this fact would
be immaterial if defendants were suing him for damages, i~
should also be immaterial in determining whether he is en·
titled to the return of any part of his down payment. The rule
to which he objects is stated in the Restatement of Contracts:
,. One who is sued for damages is required to pay no more than
just compensation, making due allowance for benefits received
by the injured party, even though lrls breach is wilful and
deliberate; but one who sues for restitution of value that he

v.

t··

Wbene';er, b;y the terms 01 an obligation, a part)' thereto ineUl'll
a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture. b;y reason of his
failure to comply with its provisions, he ma;y be relieved therefrom, upon
making full compensation to the other part;y, except in .... of a ~
ucJipat. wWf-.J, or bauduleDt breach of c1uV."
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f ....

: bas given in part performance can recover none of it if his

)

; breach is wilful and deliberate. . .. " (Rest., Contracts,
§ 357, comment e.) It also finds expression in sections 3275
'. and 3369 of the Civil Code. Section 3275 makes it a condition
of relief from forfeiture that the breach be neither grossly
negligent, wilful, nor fraudulent. Section 3369 provides that
4Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to
.m1fn"I~p. a penalty or forfeiture in any case . ... " (It&:lics
Under these sections a defaulting vendee seeking restittltioln of part of his payments will be denied relief if his
i;:..,.. p-..... is wilful. On the other hand, if he is able to prove that
vendor has received more than the benefit of his bargain,
court is precluded by section 3369 from quieting the
ff"',en<lor's title unless he refunds the excess. (Barkis v. 8cotf,
Cal.2d 116,121 [208 P.2d 367], and cases cited.)
[8] It is contended, however, that the nature of the breach
material only when the vendee is seeking under section 3275
keep the contract in force; that when the vendee is seeking
recover the excess of his part payments over the damage he
caused the vendor, the provisions of the Civil Code govthe measure of damages for breach of contract provide
G'T......".T"'VP basis for relief independently of section 3275.
Jlal;eVElr the merits of this contention, plaintiff has failed to
I<·.un.n't;r ~at the down payment exceeds defendants' damages.
l:"ll[l.,jntlroduc4~d no evidence to prove that when he repudiated
I,O~"~on1;ra~~t, the property was worth more than $88,000 to deDalILD18j namely, the $93,000 purchase price less the $5,000
payment. Plaintiff contends, however, that defendants'
"' .......",..,., proves that they lost no more than $1,500 as a rehis breach. Seven months after plaintiff repudiated the
defendants sold the business less the real property .
I"ZO.VV'U. and the purchaser received an option to buy the
nfCloe:rtv for $50,000. Meanwhile defendants had invested
.... 'fJ'wu........ $6,500 in the business. Plaintiff contends that
a:am.slilctlon is equivalent to a resale at $91,500 when an
~~StllneIlt is made for the additional investment and that
tfeIldants should therefore refund $3,500. Even if the price
real property provided in the option were a fair measure
to defendants at the time of the resale, there is no
concerning the value of the property at the time
repudiated the contlract. One of the defendants teetivalues were falling when the contract was made.
breach any benefit from a rising market would
.., _ _ _ g
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rightfully accrue to defendants as owners of the pro,Perty,
not to plaintiff. If its value had dropped to $88,000 at the
time plaintiff repudiated the contract, and defendants resold
it at that price, there would clearly be no unjust enrichment.
Nor would there be any if they retained the property and the
value rose.
Plaintiff cannot recover any of his down payment since he
has failed to prove that defendants' damages were less than
the amount he had paid.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J'J
and Spence, J.) concurred.
I
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